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Is the fact that a claim comes from a biased source a reason to think the claim false? 
Obviously it is not a conclusive reason for rejecting the claim. The claim might have been 
generated independently of the bias, in some epistemically reliable manner. Even if the bias had 
some causal influence, the claim it generates might in a particular case dovetail with the facts, 
either accidentally or otherwise. 
 One might suppose, however, that bias is a reason for thinking the claim less likely to be 
true. Barron cites an argument by Elliott Sober that a person’s belief is implausible if what 
caused the person to adopt it is independent of whether the belief is true. Barron refutes Sober’s 
conclusion on Bayesian grounds. If a belief has been produced by a process causally independent 
of its truth, then by definition the posterior likelihood of arriving at this belief, supposing that the 
belief is true, [“P(R/Q)” using Barron’s abbreviations] is equal to the prior likelihood [“P(R)” 
using Barron’s abbreviations] of arriving at this belief, without making any supposition as to 
whether the belief is true. That is what it means for the method of arriving at a belief to be 
causally independent of the truth of the belief. Since the belief has actually been arrived at, the 
likelihood of arriving at it is not zero. Hence in the statement of Bayes’ theorem the posterior and 
prior likelihood cancel out, and we are left with the information that the posterior probability that 
the belief is true [“P(Q/R)” in Barron’s notation] is equal to the prior probability that it is true 
[“P(Q)” in Barron’s notation]. The information that the belief has been arrived at in a manner 
causally independent of the truth of the belief is totally irrelevant to how confident a rational 
agent should be in its truth. Only the prior probability of the belief should count. 
 Barron’s argument assumes that rational degree of confidence in a proposition is subject 
to Bayes’ theorem, i.e., that the rational degree of confidence in a proposition Q given a 
proposition R equals the rational degree of confidence that both are true divided by the rational 
degree of confidence that Q is true. Such a view fits naturally with the view that rational degree 
of confidence is a probability function constrained by Kolmogorov’s axioms. Reputable 
epistemologists have recently questioned this assumption (Pollock, 1995). For the sake of the 
discussion, however, I propose to accept it. Given acceptance of the assumption, then, Barron’s 
argument does conclusively demonstrate, as he maintains, that arriving at a belief by a process 
causally independent of its truth is epistemically irrelevant to whether the belief is true. It is 
worth noting that Barron’s refutation is still very much to the point, since Sober continues to 
maintain his thesis, on the basis of the same example, in the second edition of his textbook, 
published just last year (2000: 210-211). 
 I hesitate, however, to draw the further conclusion that evidence of bias is epistemically 
irrelevant. This conclusion would follow immediately, of course, if we defined “bias” as 
“arriving at beliefs in a way which is causally independent of their truth.” If we mean something 
else by “bias,” however, it becomes an open question whether evidence of bias is epistemically 
irrelevant. 
 What is bias? Barron appears to give us examples or species, but no definition of the 
genus. His examples are in fact odd. In ordinary speech, we would hardly attribute bias to a 
person who arrived at an estimate of the number of people in a room by drawing a slip of paper 
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from an urn. Nor would we necessarily attribute bias to “Goldman”’s negative authority whose 
pronouncements in a certain field have always been false; the person might just be ignorant. (As 
I point out later, Barron has misconstrued Goldman’s example; for the time being I will discuss 
the example as Barron construes it, attributing it to “Goldman” rather than to Goldman.) A more 
paradigmatic example of bias would be a pre-conceived inclination to believe that human 
behavioural traits are inherited, or the contrary pre-conceived inclination to believe that they are 
shaped by environmental influences. As Barron implies at the beginning of his paper, the biases 
we identify tend to be fundamental values which shape the questions we ask, the sources of 
information we consult, the hypotheses we formulate, what we observe, how we interpret it, and 
so on. The group bias he cites at the end of his paper fits this pattern; it is an inclination to 
discriminate against, derogate and stereotype members of an outgroup to which one contrasts 
one’s own ingroup, and it can lead to the rejection of outgroup beliefs simply on the ground that 
they are beliefs of the outgroup. (I note in passing that we identify bias in many contexts other 
than the adoption of a belief. The method of selecting a sample can be biased, and the behaviour 
of people and institutions can be biased for or against individuals on the basis of their sex, 
religious affiliation, skin colour, ethnic origin, etc.)  
 Epistemic bias thus appears to be a pre-conceived tendency to systematically favour, or 
systematically oppose, a certain type of belief. By definition, it is not an effect of the truth of any 
belief to which it causally contributes. But bias involves more than such limited causal 
independence; it involves also a systematic leaning in a certain direction. 
 Is such a systematic leaning a reason to doubt the truth of a belief to which it contributes? 
It could be, if there were a reason to think that the inclination in question tended to produce false 
beliefs. “Goldman”’s negative authority, if motivated by bias, would be a case in point. As the 
number and variety of uniformly false claims in a given field made by this negative authority 
increases, it is rational to increase our confidence that the next claim made by this “authority” 
will be false. “Goldman”’s negative authority is like a clock which you have always observed to 
tell the wrong time; you can rely on it to be false, with a high degree of confidence. Note that this 
reliance does not depend on there being any intrinsic epistemic relation between the falsehood of 
previous claims by the negative authority and the falsehood of the present claim. Further, 
Barron’s Bayesian argument does not apply to “Goldman”’s negative authority, because the fact 
that the “authority” makes a certain claim in the given field may be causally dependent on the 
claim’s being true, or at least systematically (negatively) correlated with it. In fact, the known 
falsehood of this person’s previous claims in the field gives one reason to assign a lower 
likelihood to the person’s making a claim in the field, given that the claim is true, than to his 
making the claim, given only our other background information. Since the posterior likelihood is 
lower than the prior likelihood, the posterior probability is also lower than the prior probability. 
 To support a probabilistic inference from evidence of bias in the author of a claim to the 
falsehood of that claim, one needs to assume that people with the bias in question who have 
advanced a claim of the type in question generally make false claims. And one needs to look at 
the most specific characterizations of the type of bias and the type of claim for which one has 
evidence of the frequency of false claims in the class, following the principle that inductive 
generalization and extrapolation is justified only relative to the most specific classification of the 
individuals one is reasoning about. (Knowing only that Tweety is a bird, one can reasonably 
infer that Tweety probably can fly. But if one also knows that Tweety is a penguin, and that 
penguins cannot fly, then one cannot reasonably infer that Tweety can fly.) Thus, for example, if 
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one had good evidence that socio-biological explanations of human sexual behaviour advanced 
by male chauvinists were generally false, then evidence that the author of such an explanation 
was a male chauvinist would be good grounds for thinking that the explanation was probably 
false (assuming that one had no more specific overriding information about this male chauvinist 
or the type of behaviour being explained). Note however that such an inference need not involve 
a lowering of the prior probability one assigned to the explanation, before learning that the male 
chauvinist had proposed it. 
 I think therefore that, under such specific conditions, evidence of bias can be a good 
reason for thinking that a claim is false. I suspect, though, that such conditions are rarely met. 
And it seems difficult to think of other conditions under which evidence of bias would be a good 
reason for thinking a claim false. So Barron’s point holds in most cases. 
 Barron is also correct, I think, to hold that in many cases where bias is involved in the 
production of a claim, it is nonetheless rational to increase one’s confidence that the claim is 
true. This is because, especially in scientific contexts, bias is not the sole causal factor; the author 
of the claim may in fact have carefully examined some relevant evidence. Barron’s example of 
the chicken sexer who identifies all male chicks as male and 99% of female chicks as female, 
though not strictly speaking an example of bias, is a case in point. Knowledge of bias in the 
author of a claim seems to provide a reason to scrutinize more carefully the method which the 
author used to arrive at the claim, the plausibility of the data reported, and so forth–as in the case 
of the critical examination of the twin studies of the eugenicist Cyril Burt on the heritability of 
IQ scores. 
 Barron’s concluding caution about group bias is well taken. It speaks, however, against 
the commission of the genetic fallacy in arguing from the bias of a source to the falsehood of 
what that source claims. Barron has ably reinforced the majority view that such genetic 
arguments are fallacies. Given internalization of the fallaciousness of the genetic argument, 
awareness of bias in a source can have the epistemically salutary effect of encouraging closer 
scrutiny to the methodology and evidence used by that source. 
 In the course of his stimulating paper, Barron makes some inferences and claims which I 
would question. I mention them here, for completeness: 
 1) He takes Alvin Goldman to endorse an argument from an agent’s epistemic history to 
the probable falsehood of some further claim about the subject on which the agent has a bad 
track record. But the argument Goldman endorses, which he gets from Wesley Salmon, is rather 
different. It is the argument: “The vast majority of statements made by X concerning subject S 
are false. P is a statement made by X concerning subject S. Therefore, P is false.” (Goldman 
1999: 153) This argument, as Goldman notes, is a special case of the statistical syllogism, which 
is inductively valid. 
 2) The “suppressed premise” which Barron attributes to Sober in his argument (1) has the 
defect that it makes the stated premise unnecessary. Thus it is not a plausible explanation of why 
Sober thinks his conclusion follows from his stated premise. For such an explanation, I have 
argued, we need a covering generalization. In this case, the most plausible candidate seems to be: 
“Generally speaking, the number of people in a room is not the same as the number on a slip of 
paper drawn at random from an urn containing 100 slips of paper each numbered from 1 to 100.” 
Note that this is a much more specific assumption than the assumption that the belief was arrived 
by a process causally independent of whether it was true. 
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 3) In discussing his matrix of examples of independent and dependent methods of belief 
formation which generally yield true beliefs and generally yield false beliefs, Barron infers from 
the fact that pointless random choice generates a belief in one case which is almost certainly true 
that the independence relation can reliably produce true beliefs. Since one instance of a true 
result does not prove that a reliable method was used to arrive at it, Barron needs to specify the 
method more in order to draw this conclusion. Perhaps the method is to arrive at numerical 
estimates by drawing a slip of paper from Sober’s urn and announcing that the number on the 
slip is not the number to be estimated. Such a method would reliably produce true beliefs, 
because of the low prior probability that the number of members of some class is the same as the 
number on a slip of paper randomly drawn from a set of 100 slips numbered from 1 to 100. 
 4) In response to Annette Baier’s assertion that genetic arguments require us to ignore the 
origins of a claim as irrelevant, Barron objects that knowing that a claim comes from unsavoury 
origins will be good reason not to increase one’s degree of assent. How is not increasing one’s 
assent different from ignoring the origins of the claim? Ignoring the origins, I suppose, amounts 
to letting the fact that someone has made the claim make no difference to the degree of 
confidence one has in the truth of the claim. 
 5) Incidentally, I have some difficulty with Barron’s talk of degrees of assent and degrees 
of belief. It seems to me that assent and belief are either-or concepts: either one assents to the 
truth of p, or one does not; and similarly with belief. One might perhaps more felicitously talk 
about the degree of confidence with which one assents to a claim, or believes it. 
 6) Barron adopts Nozick’s view that the existence of bias is revealed in the probability 
that an agent will assert Q given that Q is true. But Nozick in the place cited is talking about bias 
in selection by the media of what they report. He is not talking about bias which influences the 
beliefs one adopts. 
 7) I agree that the low prior probability of a claim is not good evidence that bias has 
entered into its creation. But Nozick’s point is irrelevant to this contention. What seems to 
support it is rather that many claims have a low prior probability. Specific numerical results of 
experiments or systematic observations, for example, have a low prior probability. So claims 
with low prior probability can easily emerge from highly reputable sources who have followed 
impeccable methodology and have not allowed biases to influence the results they have obtained 
and reported. 
 8) Barron attributes to Donald Brown the view that political bias can increase a 
researcher’s credibility. Although one might use Brown’s example to support such a view, 
Brown himself does not do so. His point is rather that one can argue powerfully for a human 
universal on the ground that a determined effort to show that a trait is not universal has been 
unsuccessful. This is just an example of a non-fallacious argument from ignorance, which does 
not rely on the political bias of the researchers. 
 9) The objection that group bias is an epistemic pattern which must be doing some useful 
work for us does not seem reasonable to me. First of all, the pattern is not specifically, or even 
mainly, epistemic. Secondly, one cannot assume that every common attitudinal or behavioural 
trait which has a genetic basis has been specifically selected for. It might be a vestige, which has 
survived because it happened to be associated with something which was selected for. Or it 
might simply be non-deleterious. In this case, ingroup bias is a well-known phenomenon among 
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primates generally, and is on the face of it unlikely to have had any epistemic payoffs for our 
primate ancestors among whom it first emerged. 
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